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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the impact of chief executive officer (CEO) succession on new-firm performance, 
using a sample of Japanese firms founded during the period 2003–2010. When controlling for firm- 
and CEO-specific characteristics, we find that new firms with experience in CEO succession are more 
likely to increase sales than those without it. The results also reveal that CEO succession influences 
sales growth among new firms, but not employment growth. Moreover, based on successor origin, 
we classify the types of CEO succession, such as inside, outside, and family succession. The results 
reveal that both insider and outsider succession influences sales growth, while family succession does 
not.  
 
Keywords: CEO succession; Growth; Insider succession; Outsider succession; New firm; Successor 
origin. 
 





The role of founders’ human capital in new-firm performance has been addressed in a rich stream of 
literature (e.g., Bates, 1990, Cressy, 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Kato and Honjo, 2015). Owing 
to lack of business history and track record in new firms, founders must play a crucial role as a 
valuable resource in organizational performance in the early stage. Not surprisingly, many, but not all, 
founders still influence their firms by retaining the position as chief-executive officers (CEOs)—that 
is, founder CEOs—after starting businesses (Nelson, 2003). However, there are critical differences 
between starting and managing successful firms (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Boeker and Wiltbank, 
2005). Although founder CEOs have entrepreneurial skills, some may lack management skills needed 
for business expansion. Further studies on new-firm performance would be helpful for better 
understanding differences in human resources between entrepreneurship and management.  
Several scholars have highlighted a critical difference in firm performance between founder CEOs 
and non-founder CEOs (e.g., Willard et al., 1992; Jain and Tabak, 2008). Because of the pivotal role 
of CEOs, CEO succession has attracted much academic attention (e.g., Ocasio, 1994; Harris and Helfat, 
1997; Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998). While some non-founder CEOs—that is, CEO successors—deal 
with inherited strategic orientation, others may effectively alter it by introducing management 
resources and strategies differing from founder CEOs’. Whether CEO succession is successful may 
depend on the background of founder CEOs as well as on the relationship between founder CEOs 
and CEO successors, which is derived from the origin of CEO successors (hereafter, ‘successor 
origin’). For new firms, CEO succession is more likely to influence organizational performance 
because CEO successors play a pivotal role in getting on the right track of business expansion. 
However, there is still limited knowledge on CEO succession in new firms because earlier studies on 
this topic have focused mainly on the succession in large established firms (e.g., Beatty and Zajac, 
1987; Zajac, 1990). It remains an open question whether CEO succession has a significant impact on 
new-firm performance.  
This study explores the impact of CEO succession on new-firm performance, using a sample of 
Japanese firms founded during the period 2003–2010. When controlling for firm- and CEO-specific 
characteristics, we find that new firms with experience in CEO succession are more likely to increase 
sales than those without it. The results also reveal that CEO succession influences sales growth among 
new firms, but not employment growth. In particular, based on successor origin, we classify the types 
of CEO succession, such as insider, outsider, and family succession. We elucidate how successor 
origin influences new-firm performance. The results reveal that both insider and succession outsider 
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succession influences sales growth, whereas family succession does not. The findings of this study 
indicate that new firms achieve sales growth by means of insider and outsider succession. 
There are threefold contributions of this study to the literature. First, this study highlights CEO 
succession among new firms. Most studies have so far examined the impact of CEO succession on 
organizational performance of established firms, irrespective of a firm’s life cycle. By tracing post-
entry performance from founding through CEO succession, this study provides evidence on the 
effects of CEO turnover, in contrast to management continuity, on firm growth, suggesting differences 
between entrepreneurship and management. Second, in order to identify the type of CEO succession, 
we construct a unique sample of new firms with experience in CEO succession, using a database and 
survey reports provided by a credit investigation company. More importantly, we identify not only 
new firms with experience in CEO succession, but also those without it during the observation 
window, using propensity score (PS) matching. By doing so, this study describes significant 
differences in firm growth between CEO succession (treated group) and non-CEO succession 
(untreated group) while controlling for CEO-specific characteristics. Finally, this study demonstrates 
differences among new firms, according to the type of CEO succession. Successor origin is 
considered in this study, presumably because strategic orientation varies between CEOs, following 
their resources and experience. This study identifies the types of CEO succession that result in firm 
growth in the early stage of a firm’s life cycle. Such investigation could contribute to providing new 
insights into the impact of CEO succession in the literature on entrepreneurship and small business. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the research 
backgrounds, including related literature. Section 3 explains the data and variables used in the 
analyses. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, the last section provides conclusions, 
including managerial and policy implications derived from the findings of this study. 
 
RESEARCH BACKGROUNDS 
Role of Human Capital in New Firms 
According to human capital theory, individuals with a higher level of human capital achieve better 
performance than those with a lower level (Unger et al., 2011; Martin et al., 2013).1 Majority of firms 
managed by individuals with a higher level of human capital are expected to achieve better 
                                                       
[1] Human capital theory was originally developed regarding employees’ investment in knowledge and skills (e.g., Becker, 
1964). This theory has been adopted by scholars in entrepreneurship (e.g., Unger et al., 2011). 
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performance. As the human resources of new firms are limited, founder’s human capital is critical for 
the firms. The literature has addressed the issue of whether founders’ human capital plays a role in 
explaining the post-entry performance of firms, and indeed, several studies have provided evidence 
that founders’ human capital, which is associated with knowledge and experience, has a positive effect 
on firm performance (e.g., Bates, 1990, Cressy, 1996; Colombo and Grilli, 2005; Kato and Honjo, 
2015). 
There are several reasons that explain the importance of founders’ human capital. First, it is 
plausible that founders with a higher level of human capital make better managerial decisions and 
strategies. According to upper echelon theory proposed by Hambrick and Mason (1984), 
organizational performance is predicted by a top management team. Among the top management 
teams in firms, CEOs are the critical players, and they play a pivotal role in managerial decisions and 
strategic orientation of organizations (Wasserman, 2003). In this respect, new firms managed by CEOs 
with a higher level of human capital are expected to achieve better performance. Moreover, such 
CEOs are more likely to have useful networks with external organizations, including their customers 
and suppliers (Cao, et al., 2006). The indirect effect of human capital helps create better performance.  
More importantly, external suppliers of capital, such as banks and investors, are willing to invest 
in new firms managed by CEOs with a higher level of human capital. Given imperfect capital markets 
due to information asymmetry between CEOs and external suppliers of capital, CEOs’ human capital 
provides a signal to external suppliers of capital (Gimmon and Levie, 2010; Honjo et al, 2014). Even 
if a CEO has few networks with external suppliers of capital at founding, a new firm managed by the 
CEO with a higher level of human capital is more likely to access external capital markets by means 
of the signaling effect to external suppliers of capital. Consequently, these firms are more likely to 
raise necessary funds from external suppliers of capital. 
The role of CEOs of new firms is considerably greater than that of CEOs of established firms, as 
new firms tend to have limited factors of production, such as employees and financial capital. Thus, 
CEOs’ human capital may predict the post-entry performance of firms. New firms managed by such 
CEOs are expected to achieve better performance. Meanwhile, it is conceivable that human capital 
needed for better performance varies in a firm’s life cycle. There are critical differences between 
starting and managing successful firms (Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005). 
Management knowledge and skills needed at founding is not the same as those needed after 
establishing the firm. Rather, the focus of management styles must shift from creation to exploration 
in a firm’s life cycle (Rubenson and Gupta, 1992; Willard et al., 1992). A study on CEO succession 
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in new firms might provide insight into whether management knowledge and skills needed for 
founding a firm differ from those needed for managing a business in the later stage.  
 
Impact of CEO Succession on Firm Performance 
Earlier studies have debated on the impact of managerial succession on organizational performance 
(e.g., Guest, 1962; Samuelson et al., 1985; Kesner and Dalton, 1994; Ocasio, 1994).2 The impact of 
CEO succession—that is, the turnover of a CEO or the selection of a new CEO—on organizational 
performance has been extensively investigated in the literature on strategic management and 
corporate finance (e.g., Harris and Helfat, 1997; Datta and Rajagopalan, 1998; Smith and Amoako-
Adu, 1999; Huson et al., 2004). CEO succession can be regarded as the most pervasive type of 
management change (Kesner and Sebora, 1994). Essentially, CEO succession can alter knowledge 
and skills at the top of a firm (Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004). It triggers incremental organizational 
change, such as strategic re-orientation. Thus, CEO succession has a great impact on organizational 
performance. 
In the early stage of a firm’s life cycle, CEO succession affects the succession of initial resources 
and strategies. As the role of CEOs in new firms is more crucial than in large established firms, the 
selection and succession of CEOs are important issues for new firms. According to organizational life 
cycle theory, firms move from the early (start-up) stage to the growth stage requiring professional 
management and delegation (Hanks, 1990; Cetro et al., 2001; Boeker and Karichalil, 2002). To date, 
however, there is limited information on the role of CEO succession in new firms because most 
studies have examined CEO succession in large established firms (e.g., Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Zajac, 
1990; Shen and Cannella, 2003).3 While several studies focused on the impact of founder succession 
on organizational performance (e.g., Willard et al., 1992; Haveman and Khaire, 2004), they did not 
target new firms and provided no evidence on the impact of CEO succession in the early stages of a 
firm’s life cycle. There is a paucity of research on CEO succession in new firms. 
Not surprisingly, founder CEOs retain a large portion of ownership and control, and the ownership 
and control of small firms are considerably different from those of large established firms. More 
importantly, founder-CEO succession may drastically change ownership and control through the 
                                                       
[2] For a survey of the impact of CEO succession, see, for example, Karaevli (2007). 
[3] Gao et al. (2017) examined differences in CEO turnover performance between public and private firms, although they 
targeted only large private firms. 
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transfer of large equity holding, thereby resulting in non-trivial change in strategic orientation, 
compared with late-stage succession. From a different perspective, as new firms have not yet 
established organizational continuity, they may be more conductive to organizational change 
triggered by CEO turnover. In addition, although the separation of ownership and control is a critical 
issue for organizational performance from an agency perspective, agency issue for large established 
firms cannot be applied to small firms managed by founder CEOs. The transfer of ownership and 
control varies, depending on a firm’s life cycle, and CEO succession becomes a more critical event 
in the early stage.  
Consequently, it is plausible that CEO succession in new firms has a greater impact on 
organizational performance than in large established firms. This is due to limited management 
resources of new firms, which are often derived from CEOs’ human capital. Given that management 
knowledge and skills needed for founding a firm differ from those needed for managing a business in 
the later stage, the impact of CEO succession on organizational performance depends heavily on the 
timing of CEO succession. The premise on the difference in entrepreneurial knowledge and skills 
between CEOs indicates the importance of specialization in knowledge and skills in a firm’s life cycle, 
which may also promote the emergence of serial entrepreneurs who are endowed with entrepreneurial 
human capital built from their earlier experiences as business owners (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; 
Westhead et al., 2005). 
To the best of our knowledge, however, only a few studies have examined CEO succession in 
new firms. Boeker and Karichalil (2002) found that firm size and growth accelerate the rate of a 
founder’s departure using a sample of semiconductor start-up firms.4 Wasserman (2003) provided 
evidence that founder-CEO succession differs from later-stage succession using a sample of Internet 
firms. However, while these studies identified the determinants of CEO succession, they did not 
clarify the impact of CEO succession on new-firm performance. In particular, firm growth was used 
as the independent variable to examine founder departure (or CEO change) (Boeker and Karichalil, 
2002; Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005). However, it is interesting to examine whether founder departure 
promotes firm growth, as well as to examine whether firm growth triggers founder departure. Because 
of limited research on the impact of CEO succession on new-firm performance, further evidence 
                                                       








The literature on CEO succession has emphasized the importance of successor origin (e.g., Fondas 
and Wiersema, 1997; Wasserman, 2003). Earlier studies have argued that the impact of CEO 
succession on subsequent performance differs between insider and outsider successors (e.g., Zajac, 
1990; Kesner and Sebora, 1994; Parrino, 1997). While insiders are promoted from within the firms 
(e.g., employees), outsiders are external to the firms. Some studies emphasized that insider succession 
is planned when firms desire continuity, while outsider succession is chosen when firms perform 
poorly (Boeker and Goodstein, 1993; Boeker, 1997). Moreover, how CEO succession from family 
members differs from CEO succession outside the firms has often been discussed in the literature 
(e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008; Chang and Shim, 2015). Furthermore, 
some scholars focused on the impact of relay succession, in which the CEO successor is an heir 
apparent (e.g., Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2004; Minichilli et al., 2014). To date, the types of CEO 
succession, such as inside, outside, and family succession (or relay succession), have often been 
examined in the literature. 
Some studies have highlighted the advantages of insider succession. According to the continuity 
view of CEO succession, it is plausible that the successors of founder CEOs are selected among 
candidates who can succeed the current strategy of the firms. Presumably, insider succession is 
associated with maintenance strategies, while outsider succession is accompanied by more change 
(Kesner and Dalton, 1994). Firms may rather appoint insider successors unless the firms face the 
pressure of initiating a strategic change (Shen and Cannella, 2003). For new firms, insider succession 
would favor establishing managerial decisions and strategies for setting the right direction for 
sustainable growth. 
In contrast, outsider succession may result in the loss of leadership continuity in the organization 
because outsiders are less familiar with the firms’ initial resources. In addition, adverse selection and 
moral hazard issues resulting from information asymmetry between founder CEOs and their 
successors are more likely to arise in the case of outsider succession. However, several scholars have 
pointed out the advantage of outsider succession, indicating that inviting an outsider successor leads 
to better organizational performance. (e.g., Hambrick et al., 1993; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996). 
While outsider successors tend to lack firm-specific knowledge and skills, these are more variable in 
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new firms because organizational capabilities have not yet been established. Outsider succession 
rather than insider succession may bring valuable information and knowledge, in addition to diversity, 
into firms (Wiersema, 1992).5 In particular, new firms that engage in innovative activity may benefit 
from external sources of information because they tend to lack knowledge that is essential to 
commercialize new products and services (Colombo et al., 2006; Hahn et al., 2019). Outsider 
succession may enable firms to bring and initiate swift change (Zajac, 1990; Shen and Cannella, 2003; 
Karaevli, 2007).  
The advantages of outsider succession also imply the disadvantages of family succession, in 
addition to insider succession. Indeed, several scholars found a negative effect of family succession 
on firm performance (e.g., Bennedsen et al., 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci, 2008). Even though family 
members, including heirs apparent, have the advantages to secure resources initiated by founder 
CEOs, new firms do not necessarily seek growth stage. Family members tend to have an incentive to 
firm survival, rather than to business expansion. 
These mixed arguments regarding insider, outsider, and family succession indicate the need for 
further empirical investigation of the impact of CEO succession in new firms. Although many studies 
have investigated CEO succession, regardless of firm age, the importance of continuity of the 
organization may depend heavily on a firm’s life cycle. Without controlling for firm age, the 
differences in the impact of CEO succession between firms cannot be concluded. In this respect, the 
focus should be on a comparison test while controlling for firm-specific characteristics, including 
firm age. An investigation on new firms from founding through CEO succession could provide 
evidence on how CEO succession has a significant impact on organizational performance in a firm’s 
life cycle. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
Data 
A data set of new firms is constructed to examine the impact of CEO succession on firm performance. 
To do so, we obtained data on Japanese firms in the manufacturing and information service sectors, 
using Cosmos 2 compiled by Teikoku Data Bank (TDB), a credit investigation company in Japan. We 
also obtained information on CEO succession from TDB, which had identified successor origin, based 
                                                       
[5] More recently, Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2017) identified the conditions under which the benefits of outsider succession 
outweigh its costs. 
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on their survey reports. The sample includes data on CEO- and firm-specific characteristics, including 
CEO succession. The use of Cosmos 2 helps in collecting data on incorporated firms, such as joint-
stock companies, rather than sole proprietorships and partnerships. Thus, we focus only on joint-stock 
companies, by excluding sole proprietorships and partnerships. Since TDB updates Cosmos 2 every 
year, financial variables, in addition to the number of employees, is measured by year. 
The sample comprises more than 17,000 firms founded during the period 2003–2010, and we 
observe the firms’ CEO succession up to the end of 2013. In the sample of firms, we identified CEO 
succession in 1,767 firms during the observation window. According to the original classification of 
TDB, the types of successor origin are defined as follows: co-founder (63 firms), employee (237), 
external invitation (71 firms), seconded to the firm (103 firms), acquisition (16 firms), family (65 
firms), spin-off (18 firms), and unknown (1,194 firms). Considering that the classification is slightly 
ambiguous, these are combined into three types of CEO succession: insider succession (co-founder 
and employee), outsider succession (external, seconded, and acquisition), and family succession. In 
the sample, approximately 16,000 firms had no experience in CEO succession during the observation 
window. Eventually, about a one-tenth of the firms in the sample had experience in CEO succession. 
 
Methods 
While numerous scholars have examined CEO succession, very few focused on the likelihood of 
CEO succession among founder CEOs (e.g., Wasserman, 2003). It is plausible that CEO succession 
is more likely to occur in firms with special characteristics. For instance, older CEOs are more likely 
to be replaced than younger ones owing to retirement. In addition, CEO succession is more likely to 
occur in larger firms. Some scholars found a positive relationship between firm size and founder 
departure, that is, CEO turnover (e.g., Boeker and Karichalil, 2002; Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005). 
Given that CEO succession depends on CEO- and firm-specific characteristics, the results without 
controlling for these characteristics may possibly indicate that firm performance is determined by 
these characteristics, regardless of CEO succession. To overcome such methodological issues, 
including the endogeneity of CEO succession, we apply PS matching to the estimation. 
In this study, new firms with experience in CEO succession are assigned to a treated group. To 
identify an untreated group, we create a panel data set of new firms without experience in CEO 
succession. To calculate the matching scores, we use a probit regression model with variables which 
will be presented in the following section. Using the nearest one-to-one matching, we create the 
untreated group of new firms, which corresponds to the treated group. Comparing new firms in the 
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treated group with those in the untreated group, we identify whether CEO succession has a significant 
impact on firm performance. 
A differences-in-differences (DID) approach is applied to assess the impact of CEO succession 
on firm performance. As the outcomes are measured by the logarithms of sales and the number of 
employees in this study, the differences eventually indicate the growth rates of sales and employment. 
There may be a time lag in the effect of CEO succession on the growth of new firms. In this study, 
one-year lag is taken to capture the effect of CEO succession. Specifically, given that CEO succession 
occurs in period 𝑇𝑇, the differences in firm size between 𝑇𝑇 − 1 and 𝑇𝑇 + 1 are calculated, and the 
mean of the differences (i.e., growth rates) in the treated and untreated groups are presented. Thus, 
the differences in the growth rates of sales and employment between the treated and untreated groups 
are identified. Moreover, to clarify how new firms increase either sales or employment, we show the 
difference in the mean of sales per employee, following previous studies (e.g., Huson et al., 2004), 
which is simply called ‘labor productivity’ in this study. 
Furthermore, the study examines whether firm growth depends on successor origin, by identifying 
each origin as a treated group. In this study, the focus is on the three types of CEO succession: (i) 
insider (co-founder and employee), (ii) outsider (external, seconded, and acquisition), and (iii) family. 
Following the types of CEO succession, we estimate the growth rates of sales and employment in the 
treated and untreated groups. 
 
Variables 
Table II presents the definitions of variables used in the estimation. As mentioned earlier, firm 
performance is measured by sales growth, which has been used as a common performance measure 
in the literature on entrepreneurship and small business (e.g., Chandler et al., 2009; Coad et al., 2013b). 
In addition to sales growth, employment growth has often been used in the literature (e.g., Coad et 
al., 2013a). We also examine firm growth using employment growth, although the sample size 
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becomes smaller.6 Moreover, we examine the performance of new firms using labor productivity, 
which is simply defined as the logarithm of sales per the number of employees.7 
To estimate the matching scores, we use some variables that represent firm- and CEO-specific 
characteristics. Many scholars have argued that firm growth depends on firm size (e.g., Evans 1987a, 
b), and some have found a positive relationship between firm size and founder departure (Boeker and 
Karichalil, 2002; Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005). To estimate the matching scores, we use firm size prior 
to the event of CEO succession. Specifically, the variable for firm size is defined as the logarithm of 
sales in period 𝑇𝑇 − 1  for the model of sales growth, while it is defined as the logarithm of 
employment (plus one) for the model of employment growth. 
In addition to firm size, start-up capital size is measured by the logarithm of paid-in capital (except 
for capital surplus) in the first year of observation.8 Moreover, firm age is included in the probit 
regression model because some studies have indicated that firm growth depends on firm age (e.g., 
Evans, 1987a, b). Moreover, as discussed, it is considered that firm size and performance depend on 
CEO-specific characteristics, according to human capital and upper echelon theories, in addition to 
the signaling effect. With respect to CEO-specific characteristics, personal attributes are used; 
specifically, the CEO’s age, educational background, and gender are captured in this study. 
Furthermore, cohort dummies based on founding years of new firms in the sample are used. We also 
control for industry-specific characteristics using sector dummies: manufacturing, information 
service, and movie and video production, and other services. 
Table II presents the summary statistics of variables in the sample. The mean sales are about 85 
million yen, and the mean number of employees is about 5. 
 
RESULTS 
Determinants of CEO Succession 
                                                       
[6] Cosmos 2 covers the number of employees only in the last accounting period, while it covers sales for the last three 
accounting periods. Therefore, a larger sample can be constructed for sales growth than for employment growth when we 
measure the differences between two periods using Cosmos 2. 
[7] More precisely, labor productivity must be used, based on value added. However, data on value added are not obtainable 
from Cosmos 2. 
[8] Many firms tend to avoid change in paid-in capital because of complicated procedure, including approval of shareholder 
meeting. Therefore, we capture start-up capital size using paid-in capital. 
12 
 
We conduct the PS matching using the probit estimation, to identify the untreated group, in addition 
to the treated group. Table III presents the estimation results for the determinants of CEO succession. 
In Table III, the dependent variable is defined as all types of CEO succession. In columns (i) and (ii), 
firm size is measured by sales and the number of employees in period 𝑇𝑇 − 1, respectively. In column 
(iii), labor productivity is used instead of firm size.  
The coefficients of firm size prior to the event of CEO succession are positive and significant in 
columns (i) and (ii), while the coefficient of labor productivity prior to the event of CEO succession 
is insignificant in column (iii). It is found that firm size has a positive effect on the likelihood of CEO 
succession among new firms, and the results are consistent with those of Boeker and Karichalil (2002) 
and Boeker and Wiltbank (2005). In addition, the coefficients of start-up capital size are positive and 
significant in Table III. These results indicate that the likelihood of CEO succession increases with 
firm size. Regarding firm age, it is found that firm age has a negative effect on CEO succession, 
although significant at the 10% level.  
With regard to CEO-specific characteristics, the dummy for age 60 and over is positive and 
significant in Table III, indicating that CEO succession is more likely to occur in new firms managed 
by older CEOs. The dummy for university education has a significantly negative effect on CEO 
succession, indicating that CEO succession is less likely to occur in new firms managed by highly 
educated CEOs. Moreover, the dummy for gender is negative and significant, indicating that CEO 
succession is more likely to occur in new firms managed by female CEOs. 
Furthermore, Table IV presents the estimation results for the determinants of CEO succession, 
according to successor origin. In Table IV, the dependent variable is measured by three types of CEO 
succession: insider (co-founder and employee), outsider (external, seconded, and acquisition), and 
family succession. While the determinants of insider succession are estimated in columns (i), (ii), and 
(iii), those of outsider succession are estimated in columns (iv), (v), and (vi). Family succession is 
examined in columns (vii), (viii), and (ix). As for the independent variable, sales are used in columns 
(i), (iv), and (vii); employment is used in columns (ii), (v), and (viii); and labor productivity is used 
in columns (iii), (vi), and (ix). The coefficient of labor productivity in column (vi) is positive and 
significant, indicating that outsider succession is more likely to occur in new firms with higher labor 
productivity. Overall, similar results in Table III are found. 
 
DID Results: All Types 
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Tale V presents the differences in outcomes (sales, employment, and labor productivity) between new 
firms with experience in CEO succession (treated group) and those without it (untreated group), 
regardless of the type of CEO succession. Table V provides the means of sales, employment, and 
labor productivity in periods 𝑇𝑇 − 1, 𝑇𝑇, and 𝑇𝑇 + 1. The differences in outcomes between 𝑇𝑇 − 1 and 
𝑇𝑇 + 1 are also provided 
It is found that sales growth, which is measured by the difference in the logarithm of sales between 
𝑇𝑇 − 1 and 𝑇𝑇 + 1, is positive and significant in the treated group (labeled as ‘Yes’), as well as the 
untreated group (labeled as ‘No’). The results reveal that new firms increase sales, regardless of CEO 
succession. In addition, the difference in sales growth between the treated and untreated groups is 
positive and significant, indicating that sales growth significantly differs between the groups, 
depending on CEO succession. The results indicate that new firms with experience in CEO succession 
are more likely to increase sales than those without it. 
In contrast, there is no evidence that employment growth significantly differs between the treated 
and untreated groups, although employment growth in the treated group is positive at the 10% 
significance level. The results indicate that new firms do not achieve employment growth, although 
they increase sales through CEO succession. It appears to be difficult for new firms to acquire new 
employees for business expansion because of their low profile in the labor market. Moreover, there 
is no evidence that labor productivity significantly differs between the treated and untreated groups, 
while labor productivity growth in the treated and untreated groups is positive and significant. 
Overall, there is evidence that new firms with experience in CEO succession are more likely to 
increase sales than those without it when controlling for firm- and CEO-specific characteristics, that 
is, using the PS matching and DID approach. The findings of this study suggest that new firms achieve 
higher sales through CEO succession in the early stage of a firm’s life cycle. 
 
DID Results: Insider, Outsider, and Family Succession 
As discussed earlier, it is plausible that the impact of CEO succession on firm performance depends 
on successor origin. Therefore, we estimate the matching scores, according to successor origin, and 
identify the treated group that consists of new firms with experience in CEO succession, based on the 
three type of successor origin: insider, outsider, and family succession. Similar to Table V, Table VI 
presents the differences in outcomes (sales, employment, and labor productivity) between new firms 
with experience in CEO succession (treated group) and those without it (untreated group), according 
to the type of successor origin. Table VI provides the means of sales, employment, and labor 
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productivity in periods 𝑇𝑇 − 1, 𝑇𝑇, and 𝑇𝑇 + 1. This table also provides the differences in outcomes 
between 𝑇𝑇 − 1 and 𝑇𝑇 + 1. 
Regarding change in sales, it is found that sales growth is positive and significant for insider 
succession in both the treated and untreated groups. In addition, the difference in sales growth 
between the treated and untreated groups is positive and significant. The results reveal that sales 
growth significantly differs, according to insider succession, which indicates that new firms with 
experience in insider succession are more likely to increase sales than those without it. The findings 
suggest that insider succession via internal promotion has advantages, presumably because insider 
successors have firm-specific knowledge and skills and avoid high adjustment costs arising from the 
replacement of former CEOs. It is also found that sales growth is positive and significant for outsider 
succession in the treated group, and the difference in sales growth between the treated and untreated 
groups is positive and significant at the 10% level. The results indicate that new firms with experience 
in outsider succession, in addition to insider succession, are more likely to increase sales than those 
without it. The findings suggest that outsider succession improves firm performance, presumably 
because organizational learning and adaptation derived from knowledge and experience by outsider 
successors are useful for business expansion after founding. Moreover, it is found that sales growth 
is positive at the 10% significance level for family succession in the treatment group. However, there 
is no evidence that the difference in sales growth between the treated and untreated groups is 
significant for family succession. 
Regarding change in employment, it is found that employment growth is positive at the 10% 
significance level for insider succession in the treated group. In addition, it is positive for outsider 
succession in both the treated and untreated groups. However, there is no evidence that the difference 
in employment growth between the treated and untreated groups is significant for either insider or 
outsider succession. Moreover, family succession is unrelated to the difference in employment growth. 
Overall, the findings suggest that new firms do not increase employment in the early stage of a firm’s 
life cycle, regardless of CEO succession. While insider and outsider succession tends to be related to 
sales growth, it is unrelated to employment growth. The findings indicate that even if new firms have 
a demand for business expansion, they do not always increase employment, implying that it is not 
easy for new firms to acquire new employees for business expansion. 
Furthermore, regarding change in labor productivity, it is found that the growth of labor 
productivity is positive and significant for insider succession in both the treated and untreated groups, 
and the difference in labor productivity between the treated and untreated groups is positive and 
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significant at the 10% level. The results indicate that new firms managed by insider successors tend 
to improve labor productivity after insider succession. In addition, the growth of labor productivity is 
positive for outsider succession at the 10% significance level, but there is no evidence that the 
difference in the growth of labor productivity between the treated and untreated groups is significant 
for outsider succession. Moreover, family succession is unrelated to the difference in the growth of 
labor productivity between the treated and untreated groups, while the growth of labor productivity 
is found for family succession in both the groups. An important feature of the estimation is that the 
impact of CEO succession on improvement in firm performance varies according to the types of CEO 
succession, and at least, family succession does not improve firm growth after founding. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This study explored the impact of CEO succession on new-firm performance, using a sample of 
Japanese firms founded during the period 2003–2010. When controlling for firm- and CEO-specific 
characteristics, including firm size, we found that new firms with experience in CEO succession are 
more likely to increase sales than those without it. The results also revealed that CEO succession 
influences sales growth among new firms, but not employment growth. In particular, this study 
classified the types of CEO succession, such as inside, outside, and family succession, according to 
successor origin. We elucidated how successor origin matters for new-firm performance. The results 
revealed that both insider and outsider succession influences sales growth, whereas family succession 
does not. The findings of this study indicated that new firms achieve sales growth by means of insider 
and outsider succession. 
This study contributes to the literature on CEO succession by providing novel findings from 
analyses using new firms. For new firms, founders’ human capital is one of the most important 
resources, and the role of CEOs in new firms is more crucial than in large established firms.  
Whereas CEO succession is an important issue for firms, majority of studies have examined CEO 
succession in large established firms. There was still limited knowledge on the impact of CEO 
succession on new-firm performance. This study, therefore, examines whether CEO succession from 
founder CEOs to their successors is related to post-entry performance. The results indicate that CEO 
succession in new firms has a significant impact on sales growth. Such evidence would allow 
recognizing the importance of CEO succession after founding. The findings of this study suggest that 
management knowledge and skills needed for founding a firm differs from those for managing a 
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business in the later stage, and they also reveal the importance of specialization in entrepreneurial 
skills and knowledge in a firm’s life cycle.  
This study provides policy and practice implications in some developed economies, such as Japan, 
where economic growth through the emergence of fast-growing start-ups is stagnant, although small 
medium-sized enterprises constitute a large part of the economy. Under the premise that there are 
differences in human resources between entrepreneurship and management, the findings of this study 
suggest the need of serial entrepreneurs who are endowed with entrepreneurial human capital built 
from their earlier experiences as business owners (Ucbasaran et al., 2003; Westhead et al., 2005). To 
encourage the emergence of fast-growing start-ups in stagnant economies, the interdependence 
among actors, such as individuals with entrepreneurial ability and those with managerial ability is 
inevitable from the perspective of an entrepreneurial ecosystem (Acs et al., 2017; Spigel, 2017). The 
findings of this study suggest that the division of labor among entrepreneurs in a firm’s life cycle is 
effective in achieving rapid growth among new firms. In other words, top management should be 
transferable over time, as financing is changeable in a firm’s life cycle (Berger and Udell, 1998).  
Moreover, the findings of this study indicate that family succession does not improve firm 
performance, while insider and outsider succession yields sales growth. Therefore, founder-CEO 
succession without relying on family (blood) relationships lead to more opportunities for business 
expansion. Indeed, co-founders and past employees may exert more influence on rapid growth than 
family members. Further investigation on CEO succession in new firms would provide new insights 
into how founder CEOs find appropriate successors after founding. 
 
APPENDIX 
The mean variables used in the treated and untreated groups before and after PS matching are 
provided. Table AI shows the results of all types of CEO succession using PS matching. Tables AI, 
AII, and AIII show those of insider, outsider, and family succession, respectively. 
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Table I. CEO succession by successor origin in the sample 
Successor origin 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Total 
All 3 31 63 102 130 193 236 329 377 303 1767 
Insider succession 1 4 6 24 28 46 41 54 50 46 300 
Co-founder 1 1 0 5 5 7 8 17 12 7 63 
Employee 0 3 6 19 23 39 33 37 38 39 237 
Outsider succession 0 2 8 11 25 15 27 22 43 37 190 
External 0 0 4 4 11 5 14 6 17 10 71 
Seconded 0 0 3 6 13 9 12 14 21 25 103 
Acquisition 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 5 2 16 
Family succession 0 2 1 1 2 7 8 20 18 6 65 
Others (spin-off) 0 1 2 3 1 2 2 2 2 3 18 





Table II. Definition and summary statistics of variables 
Variable Definition N  Mean  S.D. 
CEO succession     
All Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is replaced in period T, 0 otherwise. 17744 0.044  0.205  
Insider succession Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is replaced by an insider successor in period T, 0 otherwise. 17117 0.009  0.094  
Outsider succession Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is replaced by an outsider successor in period T, 0 otherwise. 17045 0.005  0.068  
Family succession Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO is replaced by a family successor in period T, 0 otherwise. 16997 0.002  0.043  
Firm characteristics     
Sales Logarithm of sales in period T-1. 17744 4.446  1.368  
Employment Logarithm of the number of employees (plus one) in period T-1. 17744 1.823  1.058  
Labor productivity Logarithm of sales divided by the number of employees (plus one) in period T-1. 17744 2.623 1.018  
Start-up capital Logarithm of paid-in capital (except for capital surplus) in the first year of observation. 17744 8.806  1.486  
Firm age Number of years from the founding year. 17744 2.845  1.764  
CEO characteristics     
Age 30s Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO’s age in period T-1 is between 30 and 39, 0 otherwise.  17744 0.207  0.405  
Age 40s Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO’s age in period T-1 is between 40 and 49, 0 otherwise. 17744 0.287  0.452  
Age 50s Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO’s age in period T-1 is between 50 and 59, 0 otherwise. 17744 0.243  0.429  
Age 60 & over Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO’s age in period T-1 is 60 and older, 0 otherwise. 17744 0.173  0.378  
Age X Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO’s age in period T-1 is unknown, 0 otherwise. 17744 0.065  0.247  
University education Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO in period T-1 has university education, 0 otherwise. 17744 0.437  0.496  
Education unknown Dummy variable: 1 if the educational background of the CEO in period T-1 is unknown, 0 otherwise. 17744 0.427  0.495  
Gender Dummy variable: 1 if the CEO in period T-1 is male, 0 if female. 17744 0.948  0.221  
Others     
Cohort dummies Dummy variables for founding years: 2003, 2004, …, 2009, and 2010 (reference).  -  -  - 
Sector dummies Dummy variables for manufacturing, information services, movie and video production, and other services (reference).  -  -  - 
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Table III. Determinants of CEO succession: Probit regression results for all types of CEO succession 
  All 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii) 
Sales  0.107***   
 (0.014)   
Employment  0.153***  
  (0.019)  
Labor productivity   0.026  
   (0.017) 
Start-up capital 0.169*** 0.164*** 0.205*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Firm age  -0.022* -0.017  -0.009  
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Age 30s -0.147  -0.134  -0.138  
 (0.127) (0.126) (0.126) 
Age 40s -0.237* -0.212* -0.226* 
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Age 50s -0.029  -0.005  -0.015  
 (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Age 60 & over 0.272** 0.287** 0.275** 
 (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) 
Age X 0.490*** 0.506*** 0.497*** 
 (0.131) (0.130) (0.130) 
University education -0.235*** -0.234*** -0.236*** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Education unknown 0.107** 0.100** 0.0979** 
 (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
Gender -0.209*** -0.206*** -0.185** 
 (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) 
Constant term -3.424*** -3.214*** -3.451*** 
 (0.218) (0.218) (0.218) 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 17,744 17,744 17,744 
Pseudo R2 0.095  0.096  0.086  
Log likelihood -2891.701  -2886.181  -2919.118  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. The reference category for the CEO’s age is under 30. 
24 
 
Table IV. Determinants of CEO succession: Probit regression results by type of CEO succession 
  Insider succession   Outsider succession   Family succession 
Variable (i) (ii) (iii)   (iv) (v) (vi)   (vii) (viii) (ix) 
Sales  0.099***    0.175***    0.095*   
 (0.026)    (0.036)    (0.051)   
Employment  0.203***    0.159***    0.231***  
  (0.035)    (0.048)    (0.069)  
Labor productivity   -0.026     0.114***    -0.051  
   (0.031)    (0.039)    (0.060) 
Start-up capital 0.105*** 0.0837*** 0.138***  0.260*** 0.281*** 0.319***  0.000  -0.023  0.034  
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.034)  (0.048) (0.047) (0.046) 
Firm age -0.033  -0.032  -0.016   -0.028  -0.013  -0.013   0.060  0.062  0.069  
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) 
Age 30s -0.012  0.018  0.020   -0.526* -0.485* -0.508*  2.895  2.935  2.969  
 (0.258) (0.259) (0.257)  (0.289) (0.287) (0.289)  (199.700) (192.600) (200.200) 
Age 40s -0.021  0.026  0.017   -0.519* -0.464* -0.509*  2.679  2.726  2.750  
 (0.254) (0.256) (0.254)  (0.275) (0.274) (0.275)  (199.700) (192.600) (200.200) 
Age 50s 0.115  0.163  0.150   -0.121  -0.049  -0.106   2.732  2.793  2.830  
 (0.254) (0.256) (0.254)  (0.267) (0.265) (0.267)  (199.700) (192.600) (200.200) 
Age 60 & over 0.424* 0.467* 0.441*  -0.022  0.026  -0.020   3.193  3.253  3.266  
 (0.255) (0.257) (0.255)  (0.273) (0.272) (0.273)  (199.700) (192.600) (200.200) 
Age X 0.422  0.461* 0.442*  0.026  0.087  0.029   2.958  3.001  3.029  
 (0.265) (0.267) (0.265)  (0.290) (0.288) (0.290)  (199.700) (192.600) (200.200) 
University education 0.328*** 0.321*** 0.321***  -0.350*** -0.364*** -0.358***  1.008*** 1.045*** 1.074*** 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.112)  (0.128) (0.127) (0.127)  (0.341) (0.344) (0.348) 
Education unknown 0.526*** 0.513*** 0.503***  -0.049  -0.067  -0.063   1.181*** 1.227*** 1.213*** 
 (0.112) (0.111) (0.112)  (0.125) (0.123) (0.124)  (0.342) (0.346) (0.350) 
Gender -0.176  -0.172  -0.152   -0.336* -0.314* -0.308*  -0.085  -0.063  -0.056  
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.131)  (0.179) (0.179) (0.177)  (0.256) (0.262) (0.255) 
Constant term -7.397  -7.427  -7.258   -8.195  -8.069  -8.306   -6.977  -6.877  -6.926  
 (90.410) (172.800) (79.950)  (144.200) (146.500) (130.100)  (199.700) (192.600) (200.200) 
Cohort dummies Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 17,117 17,117 17,117  17,045 17,045 17,045  16,997 16,997 16,997 
Pseudo R2 0.077  0.089  0.069   0.178  0.164  0.161   0.135  0.153  0.129  
Log likelihood -797.936  -787.594  -804.922    -413.885  -420.749  -422.204    -195.845  -191.735  -197.299  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table V. Difference-in-difference results using the matched sample: All types 
(a) Changes in sales size 
  Sales 
CEO succession T-1 T T+1   Difference [T-1, T+1] 
All      
Yes (778) 5.054  5.252  5.298   0.244*** 
No (778) 5.140  5.214  5.242   0.102*** 
Difference (Yes-No) -0.086  0.037  0.055    0.142*** 
(b) Changes in employment size 
  Employment 
CEO succession T-1 T T+1   Difference [T-1, T+1] 
All      
Yes (784) 2.324  2.359  2.360   0.037* 
No (784) 2.298  2.300  2.325   0.027  
Difference (Yes-No) 0.026  0.059  0.036    0.010  
(c) Changes in labor productivity 
  Labor productivity 
CEO succession T-1 T T+1   Difference [T-1, T+1] 
All      
Yes (778) 2.728  2.893  2.937   0.208*** 
No (778) 2.657  2.799  2.849   0.193*** 
Difference (Yes-No) 0.072  0.094* 0.088*   0.016  






Table VI. Difference-in-difference results using the matched sample: Insider, outsider, and family succession 
(a) Changes in sales size 
  Sales 
CEO succession T-1 T T+1   Difference [T-1, T+1] 
Insider succession      
Yes (151) 5.015  5.385  5.443   0.428*** 
No (151) 5.255  5.353  5.396   0.141*** 
Difference (Yes-No) -0.240  0.032  0.048   0.288*** 
Outsider succession      
Yes (79) 5.740  5.930  6.049   0.308*** 
No (79) 5.686  5.745  5.727   0.041  
Difference (Yes-No) 0.054  0.185  0.321   0.267* 
Family succession      
Yes (31) 4.932  5.056  5.228   0.297* 
No (31) 5.276  5.285  5.301   0.025  
Difference (Yes-No) -0.345  -0.230  -0.073    0.272  
(b) Changes in employment size 
  Employment 
CEO succession T-1 T T+1   Difference [T+1 T-1] 
Insider successions      
Yes (151) 2.458  2.549  2.545   0.088* 
No (151) 2.538  2.519  2.517   -0.021  
Difference (Yes-No) 0.080  0.030  0.028   0.108  
Outsider successions      
Yes (80) 2.634  2.731  2.773   0.139* 
No (80) 2.824  2.881  2.928   0.104** 
Difference (Yes-No) -0.190  0.150  -0.155   0.035  
Family successions      
Yes (31) 2.321  2.303  2.262   -0.059  
No (31) 2.510  2.429  2.434   -0.076  
Difference (Yes-No) -0.189  0.125  -0.172    -0.017  
(c) Changes in labor productivity 
  Labor productivity 
CEO succession T-1 T T+1   Difference [T-1, T+1] 
Insider succession      
Yes (151) 2.557  2.836  2.898   0.341*** 
No (151) 2.586  2.727  2.765   0.180*** 
Difference (Yes-No) -0.029  0.109  0.133   0.161* 
Outsider succession      
Yes (79) 3.098  3.195  3.271   0.173* 
No (79) 3.075  3.176  3.128   0.053  
Difference (Yes-No) 0.023  0.019  0.142   0.120  
Family succession      
Yes (31) 2.611  2.752  2.966   0.356** 
No (31) 2.187  2.595  2.575   0.387** 
Difference (Yes-No) 0.423  0.157  0.391**   -0.032  
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
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Table AI. Mean differences between treated and untreated groups before and after propensity score 
matching: All types 
(a) Propensity score matching with sales size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Sales 5.050  4.420  0.433   5.050  5.140  -0.058  
Start-up capital 9.600  8.770  0.527   9.600  9.490  0.066  
Firm age 2.980  2.840  0.077   2.980  2.900  0.041  
Age 30s 0.130  0.210  -0.227   0.130  0.110  0.052  
Age 40s 0.170  0.290  -0.305   0.170  0.190  -0.064  
Age 50s 0.230  0.240  -0.037   0.230  0.200  0.072  
Age 60 & over 0.290  0.170  0.287   0.290  0.290  -0.009  
Age X 0.170  0.060  0.362   0.170  0.190  -0.040  
University education 0.320  0.440  -0.248   0.320  0.330  -0.022  
Education unknown 0.550  0.420  0.269   0.550  0.560  -0.008  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.052    0.940  0.930  0.036  
(b) Propensity score matching with employment size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Employment 2.320  1.800  0.492   2.320  2.300  0.024  
Start-up capital 9.600  8.770  0.530   9.600  9.480  0.073  
Firm age 2.970  2.830  0.073   2.970  2.900  0.038  
Age 30s 0.130  0.210  -0.226   0.130  0.140  -0.026  
Age 40s 0.160  0.290  -0.308   0.160  0.160  0.000  
Age 50s 0.230  0.240  -0.037   0.230  0.200  0.078  
Age 60 & over 0.290  0.170  0.290   0.290  0.270  0.034  
Age X 0.170  0.060  0.361   0.170  0.210  -0.100  
University education 0.320  0.440  -0.249   0.320  0.310  0.027  
Education unknown 0.550  0.420  0.270   0.550  0.600  -0.085  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.049    0.940  0.920  0.055  
(c) Propensity score matching with labor productivity 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Labor productivity 2.730  2.620  0.102   2.730  2.660  0.062  
Start-up capital 9.600  8.770  0.527   9.600  9.480  0.073  
Firm age 2.980  2.840  0.077   2.980  2.920  0.035  
Age 30s 0.130  0.210  -0.227   0.130  0.120  0.020  
Age 40s 0.170  0.290  -0.305   0.170  0.170  -0.003  
Age 50s 0.230  0.240  -0.037   0.230  0.180  0.125  
Age 60 & over 0.290  0.170  0.287   0.290  0.320  -0.070  
Age X 0.170  0.060  0.362   0.170  0.200  -0.069  
University education 0.320  0.440  -0.248   0.320  0.330  -0.011  
Education unknown 0.550  0.420  0.269   0.550  0.570  -0.034  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.052    0.940  0.920  0.065  
Notes: Stand. diff. indicates the differences between the treated and untreated groups. Cohort and sector dummies are not reported for 
limited space, while they are included in propensity score matching. 
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Table AII. Mean differences between treated and untreated groups before and after propensity score 
matching: Insider successions 
(a) Propensity score matching with sales size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Sales 5.010  4.420  0.422   5.010  5.260  -0.163  
Start-up capital 9.520  8.770  0.478   9.520  9.480  0.025  
Firm age 2.950  2.840  0.062   2.950  3.170  -0.110  
Age 30s 0.130  0.210  -0.227   0.130  0.110  0.041  
Age 40s 0.180  0.290  -0.270   0.180  0.170  0.035  
Age 50s 0.230  0.240  -0.043   0.230  0.160  0.168  
Age 60 & over 0.320  0.170  0.370   0.320  0.400  -0.165  
Age X 0.130  0.060  0.247   0.130  0.140  -0.019  
University education 0.440  0.440  -0.010   0.440  0.460  -0.040  
Education unknown 0.580  0.420  0.314   0.580  0.480  0.186  
Gender 0.930  0.950  -0.065    0.930  0.940  -0.027  
(b) Propensity score matching with employment size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Employment 2.460  1.800  0.652   2.460  2.540  -0.078  
Start-up capital 9.520  8.770  0.478   9.520  9.630  -0.070  
Firm age 2.950  2.830  0.065   2.950  2.920  0.018  
Age 30s 0.130  0.210  -0.227   0.130  0.170  -0.112  
Age 40s 0.180  0.290  -0.270   0.180  0.110  0.188  
Age 50s 0.230  0.240  -0.041   0.230  0.240  -0.031  
Age 60 & over 0.320  0.170  0.369   0.320  0.320  0.014  
Age X 0.130  0.060  0.245   0.130  0.150  -0.038  
University education 0.440  0.440  -0.009   0.440  0.480  -0.093  
Education unknown 0.580  0.420  0.313   0.580  0.480  0.199  
Gender 0.930  0.950  -0.064    0.930  0.930  0.26  
(c) Propensity score matching with labor productivity 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Labor productivity 2.560  2.620  -0.058   2.560  2.590  -0.025  
Start-up capital 9.520  8.770  0.478   9.520  9.710  -0.113  
Firm age 2.950  2.840  0.062   2.950  2.970  -0.007  
Age 30s 0.130  0.210  -0.227   0.130  0.080  0.153  
Age 40s 0.180  0.290  -0.270   0.180  0.160  0.053  
Age 50s 0.230  0.240  -0.043   0.230  0.270  -0.107  
Age 60 & over 0.320  0.170  0.370   0.320  0.340  -0.042  
Age X 0.130  0.060  0.247   0.130  0.130  0.020  
University education 0.440  0.440  -0.010   0.440  0.440  0.000  
Education unknown 0.580  0.420  0.314   0.580  0.490  0.173  
Gender 0.930  0.950  -0.065    0.930  0.950  -0.086  
Notes: Stand. diff. indicates the differences between the treated and untreated groups. Cohort and sector dummies are not reported for 
limited space, while they are included in propensity score matching. 
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Table AIII. Mean differences between treated and untreated groups before and after propensity score 
matching: Outsider succession 
(a) Propensity score matching with sales size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Sales 5.740  4.420  0.883   5.740  5.690  0.034  
Start-up capital 10.360  8.770  1.056   10.360  10.520  -0.097  
Firm age 2.960  2.840  0.070   2.960  2.840  0.071  
Age 30s 0.080  0.210  -0.390   0.080  0.060  0.049  
Age 40s 0.140  0.290  -0.378   0.140  0.150  -0.036  
Age 50s 0.340  0.240  0.217   0.340  0.330  0.027  
Age 60 & over 0.280  0.170  0.268   0.280  0.300  -0.055  
Age X 0.140  0.060  0.266   0.140  0.150  -0.036  
University education 0.370  0.440  -0.153   0.370  0.460  -0.180  
Education unknown 0.480  0.420  0.121   0.480  0.470  0.025  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.053    0.940  0.890  0.178  
(b) Propensity score matching with employment size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Employment 2.630  1.800  0.798   2.630  2.820  -0.170  
Start-up capital 10.340  8.770  1.046   10.340  10.320  0.017  
Firm age 2.940  2.830  0.059   2.940  3.160  -0.124  
Age 30s 0.070  0.210  -0.394   0.070  0.130  -0.166  
Age 40s 0.140  0.290  -0.383   0.140  0.070  0.203  
Age 50s 0.340  0.240  0.209   0.340  0.400  -0.129  
Age 60 & over 0.290  0.170  0.288   0.290  0.200  0.204  
Age X 0.140  0.060  0.259   0.140  0.200  -0.166  
University education 0.360  0.440  -0.162   0.360  0.410  -0.102  
Education unknown 0.490  0.420  0.133   0.490  0.490  0.000  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.049    0.940  0.910  0.094  
(c) Propensity score matching with labor productivity 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Labor productivity 3.100  2.620  0.430   3.100  3.080  0.020  
Start-up capital 10.360  8.770  1.056   10.360  10.400  -0.025  
Firm age 2.960  2.840  0.070   2.960  3.000  -0.020  
Age 30s 0.080  0.210  -0.390   0.080  0.100  -0.089  
Age 40s 0.140  0.290  -0.378   0.140  0.110  0.076  
Age 50s 0.340  0.240  0.217   0.340  0.340  0.000  
Age 60 & over 0.280  0.170  0.268   0.280  0.270  0.028  
Age X 0.140  0.060  0.266   0.140  0.150  -0.036  
University education 0.370  0.440  -0.153   0.370  0.370  0.000  
Education unknown 0.480  0.420  0.121   0.480  0.510  -0.050  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.053    0.940  0.940  0.000  
Notes: Stand. diff. indicates the differences between the treated and untreated groups. Cohort and sector dummies are not reported for 
limited space, while they are included in propensity score matching. 
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Table AIV. Mean differences between treated and untreated groups before and after propensity score 
matching: Family succession  
(a) Propensity score matching with sales size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Sales 4.930  4.420  0.351   4.930  5.280  -0.207  
Start-up capital 8.760  8.770  -0.005   8.760  8.970  -0.126  
Firm age 3.030  2.840  0.109   3.030  3.390  -0.185  
Age 30s 0.160  0.210  -0.126   0.160  0.060  0.304  
Age 40s 0.100  0.290  -0.508   0.100  0.100  0.000  
Age 50s 0.130  0.240  -0.295   0.130  0.130  0.000  
Age 60 & over 0.520  0.170  0.782   0.520  0.650  -0.259  
Age X 0.100  0.060  0.136   0.100  0.060  0.117  
University education 0.390  0.440  -0.111   0.390  0.230  0.350  
Education unknown 0.710  0.420  0.605   0.710  0.740  -0.071  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.058    0.940  0.900  0.117  
(b) Propensity score matching with employment size 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Employment 2.320  1.800  0.530   2.320  2.510  -0.177  
Start-up capital 8.760  8.770  -0.005   8.760  8.910  -0.084  
Firm age 3.030  2.830  0.112   3.030  2.000  0.623  
Age 30s 0.160  0.210  -0.126   0.160  0.230  -0.161  
Age 40s 0.100  0.290  -0.508   0.100  0.030  0.261  
Age 50s 0.130  0.240  -0.294   0.130  0.190  -0.173  
Age 60 & over 0.520  0.170  0.781   0.520  0.480  0.064  
Age X 0.100  0.060  0.134   0.100  0.060  0.117  
University education 0.390  0.440  -0.110   0.390  0.160  0.515  
Education unknown 0.710  0.420  0.604   0.710  0.840  -0.307  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.057    0.940  1.000  -0.365  
(c) Propensity score matching with labor productivity 
  Before matching   After matching 
  Treated Untreated Stand. diff.   Treated Untreated Stand. diff. 
Labor productivity 2.610  2.620  -0.007   2.610  2.190  0.389  
Start-up capital 8.760  8.770  -0.005   8.760  8.720  0.021  
Firm age 3.030  2.840  0.109   3.030  2.350  0.398  
Age 30s 0.160  0.210  -0.126   0.160  0.190  -0.083  
Age 40s 0.100  0.290  -0.508   0.100  0.100  0.000  
Age 50s 0.130  0.240  -0.295   0.130  0.130  0.000  
Age 60 & over 0.520  0.170  0.782   0.520  0.550  -0.064  
Age X 0.100  0.060  0.136   0.100  0.030  0.261  
University education 0.390  0.440  -0.111   0.390  0.160  0.515  
Education unknown 0.710  0.420  0.605   0.710  0.770  -0.145  
Gender 0.940  0.950  -0.058    0.940  1.000  -0.365  
Notes: Stand. diff. indicates the differences between the treated and untreated groups. Cohort and sector dummies are not reported for 
limited space, while they are included in propensity score matching. 
